Wednesday, June 01, 2011

Will Federal Government's Failure to Manage Department of Energy's Helium-3 Supply Lead to Nuclear False Flag Event?

According to law enforcement, there are definite nuclear threats at certain U.S. borders and ports (see: San Diego Port Officer Says Nuclear Devices Have Been Found In An American Port). Coincidentally (or not), the General Accountability Office releases a report called Managing Critical Isotopes: Weaknesses in DOE's Management of Helium-3 Delayed the Federal Response to a Critical Supply Shortage that discusses how a lack of helium-3 supply could lead to national security issues.

Helium-3 gas is a key component of equipment used at ports and border crossings to detect radiation and prevent the smuggling of nuclear material into the United States, among other uses.

Hmmm, if there is no helium-3 supply, then how will Homeland Security detect potential acts of terrorism (or a false flag event) via the transport of radioactive materials into the United States of America?

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separate agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), extracts helium-3 and controls the inventory. Since 2003, NNSA has made helium-3 available for sale to DOE’s Isotope Development and Production for Research and Applications Program (Isotope Program). After September 11, 2001, demand increased for radiation detection equipment, and in 2008, the federal government learned that it faced a severe domestic shortage of the gas. GAO was asked to review DOE’s management of helium-3 to (1) determine the extent to which the federal government’s response to the helium-3 shortage was affected by DOE’s management of helium-3; (2) determine the federal government’s priorities for allocating the limited supply of helium-3; and (3) describe the steps that the federal government is taking to increase the helium-3 supply and develop alternatives to helium-3. GAO reviewed DOE and NNSA documents and interviewed cognizant agency officials

What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DOE clarify whether the stewardship for those isotopes produced outside the Isotope Program, such as helium-3, rests with the program or another DOE entity. DOE stated that it understands and can implement these recommendations.

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